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REGULATORY OBSOLESCENCE THROUGH
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN OIL AND
GAS EXTRACTION
TIMOTHY FITZGERALD*
ABSTRACT
Extraction of oil and gas from unconventional resources, recently
enabled by technological innovations, revolutionized national and global
markets. However, exploration and production still proceed under legacy
regulations, mostly promulgated at the state level. The mismatch of modern
production realities and historic regulatory structures creates opportuni-
ties for reducing conflicts that diminish economic value. This Article
identifies regulations that originated under conventional extraction, and
often enhance productivity in that setting, but create waste when applied
to unconventional resources. Then, it identifies contractual solutions that
have evolved as resource owners and extraction firms have adapted to
new technologies. Contractual innovations help inform directions for
regulatory reform.
INTRODUCTION
The resurgence of U.S. oil and natural gas production pivoted on
exploitation of “unconventional” resources once considered subeconomic, but
rendered profitable by transformative technological advances.1 Expanded
* Texas Tech University, timothy.fitzgerald@ttu.edu. The author would like to thank
Matt Kelly and Roger Meiners for comments on previous versions, Andrew Morriss for
encouragement, Charles Frisbie for additional information on oil and gas agreements,
and Benjamin Agee for research assistance. Participants in the Energy Resources, Regula-
tion, and Risk Workshop held at the Property and Environment Research Center (PERC)
in July 2016 made suggestions that have substantially improved this work. That acknowl-
edgment in no way implicates any of those individuals for any residual bandicootery.
1 For background narrative on the technological development of unconventional resources
and their impact, see generally RUSSELL GOLD, THE BOOM: HOW FRACKING IGNITED THE
AMERICAN ENERGY REVOLUTION AND CHANGED THE WORLD (2014); DANIEL YERGIN, THE
QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD (2011); GREGORY
ZUCKERMAN, THE FRACKERS: THE OUTRAGEOUS INSIDE STORY OF THE NEW BILLIONAIRE WILD-
CATTERS (2013). For a discussion of the economics of the impact of technical changes, see
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production has important effects on domestic markets for both natural
gas2 and petroleum,3 and the impacts extend to global markets.4
Locating and producing petroleum and natural gas have a colorful
history, of which technical change has long been a part.5 Regulation was
imposed to help avoid frequent problems that reduced the value of oil and
gas resources.6 Since then, technical change has revolutionized how oil and
gas are produced by changing the nature of the resource being extracted.7
Technology changing the fundamental characteristics of the resource in
place is novel. However, the technologically enabled transition to exploi-
tation of unconventional resources creates new problems just as it obvi-
ates old ones, and the legacy regulatory framework has become obsolete in
important areas. These legacy regulations need to be revised and re-
formed to unlock the full economic potential of unconventional resources.
This Article focuses on the regulation of oil and gas extraction.
These extraction regulations prescribe the interactions among extracting
firms as well as the principal-agent problems that arise between extract-
ing firms and resource owners. Regulation has two potentially contradic-
tory goals: one is to prescribe interactions between extracting firms; the
Timothy Fitzgerald, Frackonomics: Some Economics of Hydraulic Fracturing, 63 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1337, 1337–44 (2013). See also John M. Golden & Hannah Jacobs Wiseman,
The Fracking Revolution: Shale Gas as a Case Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L.J.
955, 964, 981–82 (2015) (providing a thorough investigation of the impacts of the tech-
nical innovation).
2 See Catherine Hausman & Ryan Kellogg, Welfare and Distributional Impacts of Shale
Gas, SPRING 2015 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 71, 88–89, 95–96, 99–100,
117–18 (2015); Charles F. Mason et al., The Economics of Shale Gas Development, 7 ANN.
REV. RESOURCE ECON. 269, 271–72, 278 (2015).
3 See MICHAEL RATNER & MARY TIEMANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43148, AN OVERVIEW
OF UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND NATURAL GAS: RESOURCES AND FEDERAL ACTIONS 1, 5–6
(2015) (explaining the effects of increased domestic oil production); see also Lutz Kilian,
The Impact of the Fracking Boom on Arab Oil Producers, 38 ENERGY J. 137, 143 (2017)
(providing detailed analysis of the counterfactual oil price in the absence of the U.S.
unconventional oil boom).
4 See Frank Asche et al., Gas Versus Oil Prices the Impact of Shale Gas, 47 ENERGY POL’Y
117, 119–20, 122 (2012) (discussing the impact of U.S. shale gas production on the move-
ment of European gas prices).
5 See generally 2 HAROLD F. WILLIAMSON & ARNOLD R. DAUM, THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY (2d vol. 1959); DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY,
AND POWER (2001).
6 See discussion infra Section I.B (discussing oil and natural gas regulations).
7 Jane Bocora, Global Perspectives for the Development of Unconventional Gas, 65 SOCIAL
AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 436, 437 (2012) (e.g., changing unconventional resources from
inaccessible to accessible by breaking through impermeable sediments).
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second is to define rights and responsibilities of firms vis-à-vis the owners
of the resource. Balancing these two goals is a central challenge for
regulation. While new technology has changed the first, the second has
not been relieved.
The technological shock to oil and gas production is not unique in
the energy industry—other sectors, notably renewable electricity genera-
tion, have experienced technological leaps in recent years.8 The advance for
oil and gas production importantly, and perhaps uniquely, changes the
nature of the resource being exploited.9 While the severed oil and natural
gas are comparable to those developed from conventional resources, uncon-
ventional oil and gas resources are fundamentally different in ways ger-
mane to effective and efficient regulation of extraction. This underscores
the motivation for reconsidering oil and gas regulations. In contrast,
other energy sectors, including natural gas pipeline transportation, have
realized large economic gains from altered regulatory regimes.10 Effects
on the natural gas transportation industry have been large, but do not
stem from technical innovations.11
The current regulatory framework for oil and gas extraction is the
product of more than a century of experience,12 but it often falls short of
statutory objectives and administrative implementation. By writing inno-
vative contracts, private parties can work around some failings of the
antiquated regime. Situations that do not offer opportunities for contrac-
tual remedies are excellent candidates for regulatory reform. Opportuni-
ties for reform are tempered by an important hazard. The temporal
overlap between continuing extraction from conventional deposits and
new exploitation of shale and other resources prevents regulators from
simply switching to a new regulatory regime. This reality constrains
potential reforms for existing development, but opens the door to new
frontiers as more resources are identified and extracted.
8 Julia Pyper, No Longer a Novelty, Clean Energy Technologies Boom All Across the US,
GTM, July 19, 2018, https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/no-longer-a-novelty
-clean-energy-technologies-boom-across-the-us#gs.jcYCJTs [https://perma.cc/27MS-JHCH].
9 Bocora, supra note 7.
10 JEFF D. MAKHOLM, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PIPELINES: A CENTURY OF COMPARATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 72–77 (2012).
11 See generally Matthew E. Oliver & Charles F. Mason, Natural Gas Pipeline Regulation
in the U.S.: Past, Present, & Future, FOUNDATIONS AND TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS (May
2018).
12 David W. Miller, The Historical Development of the Oil & Gas Laws of the United States,
51 CALIF. L. REV. 506, 511 (1963).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Unconventional Oil and Gas
“Unconventional” resources are producing formations that lack
sufficient permeability to economically produce without technology beyond
the traditional vertical well with artificial lift.13 Some resources, such as
shales and coals, are the source rock in which hydrocarbons originate,
rather than reservoirs into which hydrocarbons migrate over time.14 These
resources require varying degrees of reservoir stimulation to increase
permeability, often achieved by hydraulic fracturing.15 After stimulating
the reservoir in this fashion, the oil and gas trapped in the tight spaces
of the rock can flow to the wellbore and then to the surface.16
The technologies that have unlocked unconventional resources
were developed after long experimentation. Considerable acknowledg-
ment is afforded to the combination of horizontal drilling and large-
volume hydraulic fracturing in the Barnett Shale in Texas,17 though
credit should be shared more widely.18 The generalist term “fracking”
encircles a large collection of technologies, including hydraulic fracturing,
horizontal and directional drilling, and advanced seismography tech-
niques19 that have allowed profitable investment in resources that were
13 See, e.g., Liang Wang et al., A Technical Review on Shale Gas Production and Uncon-
ventional Reservoirs Modeling, 6 NAT. RESOURCES 141, 142 (2015). A parsimonious way
of differentiating between conventional and unconventional resources is to compare a
measure of permeability: conventional reservoirs typically have permeability in the milli-
darcies (passage of one one-thousandth of a cubic centimeter of fluid (having a viscosity
of one centipoise) per second through a sample one square centimeter in cross-sectional area
under a pressure of one atmosphere per centimeter of thickness) whereas unconventional
reservoirs have permeabilities measured in micro- or nanodarcies. The unconventional
resources are therefore between a thousand and million times less likely to allow fluids
to move under the surface. Here we distinguish between artificial lift and enhanced oil
recovery by the need for more than simple artificial lift, such as repressuring formations
to replace lost reservoir pressure.
14 See discussion infra Section II.C (discussing characteristics of unconventional sources).
15 Bocora, supra note 7.
16 Id.
17 See GOLD, supra note 1, at 15 (providing background on what features of the Barnett
Shale in Texas led to technological innovation); see also ZUCKERMAN, supra note 1, at 34.
18 See generally Golden & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 968–76 (detailing various tech-
nologies that contributed to unlocking unconventional resources).
19 For a relatively early description of the impacts of technical change in oil and gas
extraction, see Douglas L. Bohi, Changing Productivity in U.S. Petroleum Exploration
and Development, Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 98-38 (1998). See also
GOLD, supra note 1, at 5 (discussing similar topics).
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subeconomic with conventional technology.20 Other technologies have
made important contributions to the ability to exploit unconventional
resources economically: measurement-while-drilling technology, which
allows for geosteering and effective control over directional and horizon-
tal drilling; microseismic surveying, which allows for measurement and
evaluation of fractures; packers and sleeves that isolate portions of the
wellbore and create the possibility for “multi-stage” fracs; and thousands
of other incremental innovations to elements of the exploration and
production process.21
One result of new technological capacity has been a massive
increase in domestic oil and gas production, largely from previously sub-
economic resources.22 Domestic supply shocks have affected global markets,
with the linkages more explicit thanks to the relaxation of a decades-old
trade ban for crude oil,23 and the new ability to export natural gas to
overseas markets.24 Before these pathways opened, notable basis differ-
entials between U.S. and global oil benchmarks, and between U.S.,
European, and East Asian natural gas, were motivations for policy action.25
20 Fitzgerald, supra note 1, at 1337–39.
21 Golden & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 973–74 (detailing these and other innovations and
summarizing that “[i]n short, an ever-expanding multiplicity of technological develop-
ments have [sic] helped increase yields or reduce costs . . . .”).
22 Where Our Natural Gas Comes From, U.S. ENERGY INFO ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov
/energy_in_brief/article/shale_in_the_united_states.cfm [https://perma.cc/G2NH-UKY5]
(last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
23 Together these changes are likely to have affected decisions by OPEC to keep high
production targets even as global oil prices fell in 2014 and 2015. See Stanley Reed,
OPEC, Keeping Quotes Intact, Adjusts to Oil’s New Normal, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/06/business/international/opec-oil-prices.html
[https://perma.cc/T4XK-WWWG]. The ban on crude exports from the lower forty-eight
had been in place for forty years, and was incrementally eased in 2014 to allow certain
firms to export certain light grades (condensates). In December 2015 the remaining
restrictions on exports were lifted by Congress. America Lifts Its Ban on Oil Exports, THE
ECONOMIST (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2015/12/18
/america-lifts-its-ban-on-oil-exports [https://perma.cc/4VGJ-8VAU].
24 Zuckerman discusses the background to reverse the flow of liquefied natural gas (“LNG”)
from import to export. See ZUCKERMAN, supra note 1, at 24–28, 40, 45. Cheniere Energy
exported the first LNG cargo from a continental U.S. port in March 2016. Export Projects
Update March (2016), LNG ALLIES, http://www.lngallies.com/epu-2016-03-31/ [https://
perma.cc/7DB6-58NR] (last updated Mar. 31, 2016). For further analysis of how this af-
fects global LNG and gas markets, see Kenneth B. Medlock et al., The global gas market,
LNG exports and the shifting US geopolitical presence, 5 ENERGY STRATEGY REV. 14 (2014).
25 On basis differentials in the oil market, see Bahattin Buyuksahin et al., Physical Markets,
Paper Markets and the WTI-Brent Spread, 34 ENERGY J. 129 (2013). On gas market
differentials between Europe and United States, see Timothy Fitzgerald & Randal R.
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Relatively high prices and new technology led to a rapid prolifera-
tion of potential extraction sites, many of which are located in known
geological provinces where conventional development failed or was only
marginally productive (e.g., Bakken).26 New drilling programs pressed
into regions such as Pennsylvania and Ohio that were largely unfamiliar
with the industry and its practices.27 Mineral interest owners, surface
landowners, local residents, and the general public in those places turned
to oil and gas regulators for relief from transgressions real and perceived.28
Because unconventional wells typically have much higher decline rates
than historic conventional wells (meaning production naturally declines
faster over time than conventional wells),29 many more wells are needed
to sustain production.30 Residents’ objections are usually centered on the
drilling of thousands of new wells rather than the amount of production
from each well. Because of relatively rapid production decline rates,
developing unconventional resources requires a large number of wells.31
Drilling such wells is subject to a wide variety of state regulations.32
B. Oil and Gas Regulation
Regulation of oil and gas extraction activities has historically been
the domain of states.33 Regulation is loosely coordinated through the
Rucker, U.S. Private Oil and Natural Gas Royalties: Estimates and Policy Relevance, 40
OPEC ENERGY REV. 3 (2016).
26 Brooklyn J. Anderson & Gene L. Theodori, Local Leaders’ Perceptions of Energy Develop-
ment in the Barnett Shale, 24 S. RURAL SOC. 113, 125 (2009).
27 The Marcellus Shale, Explained, STATE IMPACT PENN., https://stateimpact.npr.org/penn
sylvania/tag/marcellus-shale/ [https://perma.cc/EC3G-5FM4] (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
28 See, e.g., Kathryn J. Brasier et al., Residents’ Perceptions of Community and Environ-
mental Impacts from Development of Natural Gas in the Marcellus Shale: A Comparison
of Pennsylvania and New York Cases, 26 J. OF RURAL SOC. SCI. 32, 34–35, 42, 54–55 (2011);
Jeffrey B. Jacquet, Review of Risks to Communities from Shale Energy Development, 48
ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 8321, 8322–25 (2014); Dianne Rahm, Regulating Hydraulic Fracturing
in Shale Gas Plays: The Case of Texas, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 2974, 2978–80 (2011).
29 Richard G. Newell et al., Trophy Hunting vs. Manufacturing Energy: The Price-Respon-
siveness of Shale Gas, 5, 12–14 (Resources for the Future, Working Paper No. 16-32, 2016).
See also Charles F. Mason & Gavin Roberts, Price Elasticity of Supply and Productivity:
An Analysis of Natural Gas Wells in Wyoming 2 (Resources for the Future, Working
Paper No. 17-28, 2017).
30 Mason & Roberts, supra note 29, at 2.
31 Id.
32 See Nathan Richardson et al., The State of State Shale Gas Regulation, Resources for
the Future Report 1 (2013).
33 See ROBERT BRADLEY JR., OIL, GAS & GOV’T: THE U.S. EXPERIENCE (1996). The third
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Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission.34 The Commission was
founded in 1935 to help coordinate state efforts to prevent waste of oil
and gas resources.35
States have primary regulatory authority for oil and gas produc-
tion within their boundaries.36 Overlapping federal oversight has been
contemplated, but aside from federally owned minerals, in most cases
federal regulations do not directly pertain to oil and gas production
activities.37 New federal rules have been discussed, including regulations
for methane leaks38 and proposals regarding hydraulic fracturing,39 but
the future of these regulations and the extent to which they will change
current industry practice is currently unclear. Primary regulatory over-
sight remains with the states.40
The motivation for regulation of oil and gas production should
lead the analysis of the efficacy of those regulations. Pertinent detail of
the mechanisms by which regulation takes force follows.
chapter covers the history of state-level regulation, with pages 127–28 covering the
economic disincentives created by state-level conservation regulation. Id. For a more
recent analysis of the same issues, see Richardson et al., supra note 32, at 11–13. The
appendix material provides a state-by-state summary of oil and gas regulation across a
number of dimensions. Id.
34 Blakely M. Murphy, Administrative Mechanism of the Interstate Compact to Conserve
Oil and Gas: The Interstate Oil Compact Commission, 1935–1948, 22 TULSA L. REV. 384,
385–86 (1948).
35 These regulations may very well have been promulgated after considerable waste had
occurred. See Gary D. Libecap & Steven N. Wiggins, Contractual Responses to the Common
Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil Production, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 87, 93–96 (1984) (standing
as evidence for either the effectiveness of the regulation or that the waste had already
occurred and was curtailed by private forces before the regulation was in place).
36 Oil and gas regulation in the USA, LEXOLOGY, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail
.aspx?g=ec3d300b-9a94-4a86-b222-390650dcd245 [https://perma.cc/VE3Y-67PS] (last
visited Oct. 29, 2018).
37 Robert W. Swenson, Legal Aspects of Mineral Resources Exploitation, in HISTORY OF
PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 700–02 (1968) (providing a detailed history of the
development of statutory law for development of federally owned oil and gas minerals).
38 See Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation, 81
Fed. Reg. 83,008, 83,008-012 (Nov. 18, 2016) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3100, 3160,
& 3170).
39 Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 43 C.F.R.
§§ 3160–3165 (2015). The BLM issued a final rule on hydraulic fracturing, applicable to
federal and Indian minerals in 2015. Id. Some groups hoped this standard would be
widely adopted by states as well.
40 See Thomas E. Kurth et al., American Law and Jurisprudence on Fracking—2012, 58
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1, 25–68 (2012) (examining the similarities and differences be-
tween numerous state laws regarding hydraulic fracturing).
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1. Why Regulate Oil and Gas Extraction Activities?
Extraction, transport, and processing of oil and gas is subject to a
range of regulation that varies across states.41 Historically, three motiva-
tions inspired regulation.42
a. Uncertain Values
Imperfect information is a defining characteristic across a number
of dimensions, starting with geological risk. Determining the location
and richness of deposits is the focus of exploration efforts.43 Even after
discovery, substantial uncertainty about the future path of both costs
and output prices potentially influences the expected value of a given
deposit.44 The revenue risk has two parts. One is production risk, which
stems from imperfectly known geology.45 Wells may perform well or poorly;
they may start strong and peter out early. Until wells are drilled and
produce, the time profile of production is not known.46 The second part
is price risk arising from the market.47 Prices might swing at the whim
of distant market forces, or because of manipulation by other actors such
as local transportation firms.48 The cause of the price change does not
matter to the small producer so much as the magnitude and direction.
41 See BRADLEY, supra note 33 (providing a summary of cross-state variation in Chapter
3). See also Richardson et al., supra note 32, at 90–93.
42 One important study covers the development of property rights to petroleum resources
but focuses entirely on common pool problems and the development of rights to address
the economic problems created therein. Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic
Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S589,
S589–94 (2002). A more recent and broader view considers both common pool externalities
and pecuniary externalities stemming from market power attributable to the downstream
transportation and processing sectors. John R. Boyce, Externality Regulation in Oil and
Gas, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENERGY, NATURAL RESOURCE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
7–8 (2013). Even in a perfectly competitive setting, output price variation has been an
important concern in securing the value of oil and gas deposits. Id.
43 Overview of oil and gas exploration and production process, in ENVT’L MGMT. IN OIL &
GAS EXPLORATION AND PROD. 4.
44 Overview of oil and gas exploration and production process, supra note 43, at 7.
45 Id. at 6–7.
46 Id.
47 Shale Gas and Other Unconventional Sources of Natural Gas, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy-/coal-and-other-fossil-fuels/shale-gas-un
conventional-sources-natural-gas#.W9YNBxNKjow [https://perma.cc/S78B-BF75] (last
visited Oct. 29, 2018).
48 See Boyce, supra note 42, at 7–8.
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A collection of statutory and administrative law developed to deal
with the information problems arising from geologic uncertainty; “[i]t is
unfortunate that our law as to oil and gas developed before scientific
information was available as to the exact nature of oil and gas reser-
voirs.”49 However, the reality is that some law had to be in place. Specific
investments in learning required security, and law developed to provide
it as uncertainty was resolved by drilling. Experience with exploration,
production, and improving technology to evaluate resources ex ante has
reduced the extent of the geological uncertainty.50 Thanks in part to a
century of experience, and the technologies that have allowed for exploi-
tation of unconventional resources, changing the regulatory frame may
now be feasible and offer benefits.
On the price risk front, risks for products and inputs are better-
managed today than historically, thanks to futures markets and an
extension of techniques of financial engineering to sell risk.51 The majority
of producers now use hedges or volumetric production payments to limit
exposure to volatile output prices.52 Improved risk management is a reality
for inputs as well as outputs. As an example, long-term contracts for
49 A.W. Walker, Jr., Property Rights in Oil and Gas and Their Effect on the Police Regulation
of Production, 16 TEX. L. REV. 370, 370 (1938). Although this observation was made while
conventional resources were still relatively abundant, the alternative to rulemaking
under uncertainty is hard to consider because of the high transaction costs inherent in
developing scientific information.
50 In Texas, the dry hole rate fell from over 10 percent (one in ten wells drilled was dry) in
2005 to under 1 percent (less than one well in one hundred was dry) by 2007. Author’s
calculations from Texas Railroad Commission data. See also Richard Norgaard, Resource
Scarcity and New Technology in U.S. Petroleum Development, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 265,
265–67 (1975) (citing dry hole statistics for the entire U.S. in 1939 and 1968 of 16 percent
and 43 percent, respectively). Author’s calculations from EIA drilling productivity data
indicate aggregate dry hole percentage across oil and gas wells as high as 43 percent (1969)
falling to below 10 percent in 2007 and 2008. Petroleum & Other Liquids: Drilling Pro-
ductivity Report, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/?src
=home-b1 [https://perma.cc/4K3B-YMDY] (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
51 Oil and Gas Futures: Reducing Risk in a Volatile Market, DRILLINGINFO, https://info
.drillinginfo.com/oil-futures-reducing-risk-volatile-market/ [https://perma.cc/YH7D-63M4]
(last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
52 There is a technological change story here as well, in the technology of finance. See
Christopher L. Culp & J. Paul Forrester, Structured Financing Techniques in Oil & Gas
Project Finance: Future Flow Securitizations, Prepaids, Volumetric Production Payments,
and Project Finance Collateralized Debt Obligations, in ENERGY AND ENVTL. PROJECT FIN.
L. AND TAX’N 536 (2009). On VPPs specifically, see Pete Speer, Volumetric Production
Payments—Analytical Implications and Adjustments for E&P Companies (Working
Paper, 2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=975271 [https://perma.cc/VZL2-QNUR].
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inputs like drilling rigs not only lock in relationship-specific productivity
gains,53 but also provide certainty about input costs for producers.
b. Commonality of Resource
Extraction from conventional deposits is rival, but not fully ex-
cludable. Extraction is often characterized as a common pool resource such
as a depletable fishery or grazing common.54 When oil and gas resources
have many owners, as many conventional resources do, regulation has
historically been viewed as one means to protect correlative rights.55 In
their study of the development of property rights to common pool petro-
leum reservoirs, Libecap and Smith (2002) delineate four possible end
results of a common pool reservoir:
[T]here were four distinct property rights scenarios, each
with its own costs and benefits, that provided alternative
“resolutions” of the common-pool production externality:
(1) extractive anarchy, in which actions by individual pro-
ducers intending to exploit the rule of capture go unre-
strained; (2) conservation regulation, in which government
prohibits producers from engaging in specific wasteful ac-
tions that anarchy might invite; (3) buy-outs, in which a
single producer purchases all others’ holdings in the com-
mon pool and thus internalizes the externality; and (4) uniti-
zation, in which the separate producers exchange their
individual holdings in the reservoir for agreed shares of a
single, commonly managed enterprise that encompasses
the entire pool.56
Unitization is not always voluntary and can be imposed by regula-
tion.57 A complementary view is that three regimes are possible: extractive
53 As an example of relationship-specific gains in drilling, see Ryan Kellogg, Learning by
Drilling: Interfirm Learning and Relationship Persistence in the Texas Oilpatch, 126 Q.
J. ECON. 1961, 1961–63 (2011).
54 Robert Holahan & Gwen Arnold, Transforming Goods: Common-pool Resources and
Private Goods in the Production of Oil and Gas, http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper
_31081.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PWY-HE3B].
55 Gary D. Libecap, The tragedy of the commons: property rights and markets as solutions
to resource and environmental problems, 53 AUSTRL. J. OF AGRIC. AND RESOURCE ECON.
129, 131–32 (2009).
56 Libecap & Smith, supra note 42, at S591.
57 Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, Regulatory Remedies to the Common Pool: The
Limits to Oil Field Unitization, 22 ENERGY J. 1, 5 (2001).
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anarchy, regulation, or contractual solutions. Regulation can take the
prototypical form of prescription of productive activities. Compulsory
unitization is another form of regulation, and forces producers to reach
a particular type of contractual solution.58 Contractual solutions include
voluntary unitization agreements and buyouts.59 This underscores the
tradeoff between regulatory and contractual solutions to common pool
problems. Conservation regulation and buy-outs stand in stark contrast
to one another in this regard. Recognizing that the efficiency loss attendant
with extractive anarchy may differ for conventional versus unconven-
tional deposits is key to understanding the motive for regulatory reforms.
Because the contents of the subsurface are uncertain ex ante, the
rule of capture was adopted to dictate how oil and gas become private
property.60 The rule of capture holds that there is no liability for produc-
ing oil and gas that was originally in place under the land of another, so
long as the producing well itself does not trespass.61 The rule was adapted
to oil and gas from previous applications to groundwater and wildlife.62
Like oil and gas, in those original settings the transaction costs associated
with verifying ownership ex ante are quite high, so the ex post rule of
capture was adopted.63
However, the capture rule led to concerns that correlative rights
would be impinged upon by aggressive neighbors.64 Such incentives could
lead to rapid extraction and dissipated rents, as neighbors engage in a
race to drill and as a result deplete virgin pressure faster than the rate
58 Compulsory Pooling Laws: Protecting the Conflicting Rights of Neighboring Landowners,
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGE., http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/compulsory-pooling-laws
-protecting-the-conflicting-rights-of-neighboring-landowners.aspx#understanding [https://
perma.cc/NGM9-8NSR] (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
59 Compulsory Pooling Laws: Protecting the Conflicting Rights of Neighboring Land-
owners, supra note 58. See generally Owen L. Anderson, The Anatomy of an Oil and Gas
Drilling Contract, 25 TULSA L. REV. 359–76 (1990).
60 On the adoption of the rule, see TERENCE DAINTITH, FINDERS KEEPERS?: HOW THE LAW
OF CAPTURE SHAPED THE WORLD OIL INDUSTRY 18–50 (2010).
61 The standard definition of the rule comes from Hardwicke: “The owner of a tract of land
acquires title to the oil and gas which he produces from wells drilled thereon, though it
may be proved that part of such oil or gas migrated from adjoining lands.” Robert E.
Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as Applied To Oil and Gas, 1935
A.B.A. SEC. MINERAL AND NAT. RES. L. PROC. 1, 5 (1935).
62 A broader discussion of the rule of capture and comparison to other resources is found
in Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law, 38 J.L. & ECON.
393, 394–95 (1995).
63 Id. at 396.
64 Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture—An Oil and Gas Perspec-
tive, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 910 (2005).
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that would allow for maximum recovery.65 Boyce (2013) identifies three
consequences of employing the rule of capture: excessive drilling to
protect resource in place from capture by neighbors; rapid destruction of
reservoir pressure; and the necessity of expensive investments in storage
for produced volumes.66
c. Depletion
Oil and natural gas found in either conventional or unconven-
tional deposits are nonrenewable resources.67 They can most cheaply be
stored in the ground,68 but such storage depends on secure property rights
in situ. Property rights for common pool conventional resources are in-
herently insecure because a neighbor can always extract.69 Once oil and
gas are extracted, the patient owner has lost his or her product. The theo-
retical measure of the value of the marginal unit extracted is the user
cost, or the opportunity cost of extracting today what could be saved and
extracted in the future.70 For deposits that are small relative to the current
market size, this value is near the opportunity cost of extraction today.
2. Regulatory Mechanisms for Oil and Gas Production
Boyce (2013) provides a summary of regulatory interventions,
achieved through a mix of statutory and administrative rules at both fed-
eral and state levels.71 He focuses on seven dimensions: casing and
plugging, spacing, prorationing, unitization, pooling, common carriers, and
waste.72 Although Boyce commingles regulations addressing two concur-
rent problems in oil and gas extraction (common pool and downstream
65 Boyce, supra note 42, at 9–10.
66 Id.
67 Non-renewable energy, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclo
pedia/non-renewable-energy/ [https://perma.cc/M8K5-A783] (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
68 See Underground Natural Gas Storage: Facts & Figures, INGAA, https://www.ingaa
.org/File.aspx?id=27274&amp;v=3c5b7072 [https://perma.cc/49BR-2PUV].
69 See Boyce, supra note 42, at 9–10 (rule of capture leads neighbors to engage in a race
to drill).
70 Karim Pakravan, Estimation of user’s cost for a depletable resource such as oil, 6
ENERGY ECON. 35 (1984).
71 See Boyce, supra note 42, at 9–10.
72 Pakravan, supra note 70, at tbl.2. See also BRADLEY, supra note 33, at 1919–33 app. B
(providing a longer list of federal statutes pertaining to oil and gas). However, because
most regulation of oil and gas production is state-level, the federal statutes have limited
application, largely limited to federal minerals.
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market power), several types of regulations are clearly applicable to
commonality of the resource.73 These include well spacing, pooling re-
quirements, and unitization.74 In addition, two classes of regulations
relate to the inherent non-renewability of the resources: waste statutes
and prorationing rules.75
Bradley (1996) makes finer distinctions about the implementation
of state regulation, but focuses on the same group of problems: spacing min-
imums, pooling, allowables (prorationing), and unitization.76 The following
discussion focuses on spacing, pooling, unitization, waste, and prorationing.
Regulations are intended to correct problems arising from extrac-
tive anarchy, like overinvestment in wells.77 Despite the best intentions,
regulations often fail to achieve their goals, and that failure creates real
costs. The costs of oil regulation have been recognized for decades and are
nontrivial.78 The economic value unlocked by the technological advances
in oil and gas will be diminished by continued regulation in counterpro-
ductive dimensions.
a. Well Spacing
Too many wells in a reservoir can deplete virgin reservoir pres-
sure without corresponding increased production, leaving valuable oil
trapped underground and requiring pressure to be recreated by various
costly means.79 One way to avoid excessive mining of reservoir pressure
is to limit the number of wells that can access the subsurface reservoir.80
73 See generally, e.g., Miller, supra note 12 (explaining mineral leasing and public benefit
regulations).
74 Stephen Alan Ungerman, Oil and Gas—Proration—The Railroad Commission’s Authority
to Protect Correlative Rights, 21 SOUTHWEST L.J. 372 (1967) (explaining that Texas adopted
rules on prorationing and waste to promote efficient use and conservation of oil and gas
as nonrenewable resources).
75 BRADLEY, supra note 33, at 141–43 (well spacing requirements developed to prevent
excessive mining).
76 BRADLEY, supra note 33, at 1948–49 app. F. Bradley uses a finer typology of thirteen
categories in Appendix C. Id. at 1934–35 app. C.
77 See Golden & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 1040.
78 Morris A. Adelman, Efficiency of Resource Use in Crude Petroleum, 31 S. ECON. J. 101,
105 (1964) (stating that losses from regulation are over $4 billion annually).
79 Soren T. Anderson et al., Hotelling Under Pressure 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 20280, 2014).
80 Oil and Gas Basics: Drilling and Spacing Units, MARTINDALE, https://www.martindale
.com/natural-resources-law/article_Bass-Law_1537320.htm [https://perma.cc/U2TX-6NTY]
(last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
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Avoiding the forests of derricks that sprang up historically, notably in
urban oil fields like Long Beach and Oklahoma City, was the primary
motivation for well spacing requirements.81 Initial spacing requirements
were still tight by today’s standards (one or two acres).82 During World
War II, spacing units were increased in size to reduce demand for steel.83
The success of those larger spacing units (40 acres for oil and 640 acres for
gas) led to wide adoption of larger spacing units in the postwar years.84
Spacing units are the smallest spatial unit in regulatory stan-
dards.85 They are imposed to avoid interference between wells by spread-
ing the wells across the field so that each can maximize recovery.86 The
spacing unit varies in size based on geologic characteristics at the field
level.87 More transmissivity implies larger spacing units, to avoid inter-
well interference. In a world of vertical wells, the drained area is circular,
so spacing units are an exercise in fitting circles into squares.88
Figure 1: Drainage of Traditional Spacing Units
New technology has two implications for traditional spacing units.
First, orientation matters for directional wells, and the drained area is
no longer circular. A horizontal well drilled in one corner of a rectangular
81 Understanding Spacing in Oklahoma, OSEBERG, https://oseblog.oseberg.io/understand
ing-spacing-oklahoma [https://perma.cc/5RGY-ZFQ9]. See also BRADLEY, supra note 33,
at 141–43 (discussing other motivations for the development of well-spacing regulations).
82 BRADLEY, supra note 33, at 142.
83 Id. at 239–40.
84 Boyce, supra note 42, at 18.
85 Oil and Gas Basics, supra note 80.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
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parcel will drain a slightly different area than one drained on the adjacent
corner. Second, pad drilling means that spacing units include several
wells rather than one,89 and the notion that the spatial separation of wells
is avoiding inter-well interference is false.90 Within a unit, the operator
has the incentive to maximize value because there is no external cost.
Figure 2: Drainage of Horizontal Spacing Units
Even though unconventional resources have less transmissivity,
larger spacing units have been adopted as unconventional resources have
come into play.91 With horizontal drilling and ever-longer laterals on wells,
spacing units have grown to 1280 acres and even larger.92 These larger
units cannot be drained by a single well, even if that well is fractured.93
Technology has outstripped the spacing unit because the unit no longer
represents the area drained by a single well.94 If interfering wells maxi-
mize profits, then the operator, not the regulator, is best-positioned to
determine that.95
89 Investing News Network, Multi-Well Pad Drilling Technology and North America’s
Shale Oil Boom, INN (May 9, 2018), https://investingnews.com/daily/resource-investing
/energy-investing/oil-and-gas-investing/multi-well-pad-drilling-technology-and-improving
-north-americas-drilling-efficiency-and-shale-oil-boom/ [https://perma.cc/6JQD-7JVQ].
90 Frank Sylvester & Robert W. Malmsheimer, Oil and Gas Spacing and Forced Pooling
Requirements: How States Balance Energy Development and Landowner Rights, 40 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 47, 55–57 (2015).
91 See Oil and Gas Basics, supra note 80 (a single spacing unit an encompass multiple wells).
92 Sylvester & Malmsheimer, supra note 90, at 55–57.
93 INTERSTATE OIL AND GAS COMPACT COMM’N LEGAL & REG. AFF. COMM., Horizontal Well
Development Pooling, Spacing, and Unitization: A Regulatory Toolbox for Key Policy,
Regulatory, and Statutory Considerations, IOGCC (June 2015), http://iogcc.ok.gov/Web
sites/iogcc/images/PSToolboxFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8E9-GAGR].
94 Overview of oil and gas exploration and production process, supra note 43, at 10.
95 Some evidence exists that greater fracture densities, as from multiple wells, may
enhance production. See Erdal Ozkan et al., Comparison of fractured horizontal-well
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A direct example of the conflict between existing regulations and
new technology is the increased need for exceptions to well spacing require-
ments. In Texas, the statewide spacing requirements—1200 feet between
wells and 467 feet to the nearest property line—are established under an
administrative rule known as Rule 37.96 Specific fields can be regulated
under different rules. As the area drained by a single well has changed,
particularly with the advent of directional drilling,97 the statewide spacing
rules are wholly inadequate. Instead of working to coordinate a large
group of adjoining mineral owners, many operators resort to a regulatory
exception to the standard spacing rule.98 The ad hoc nature of such
exceptions, which are granted by acknowledging that the statewide or
field spacing rule is inadequate for the modern realities of development,
allow for fragmentation of the landscape and increase the potential for
leaving a valuable resource trapped in small underground areas. The
exceptions also allow for legal drainage of oil and gas from adjoining tracts.
Texas is the largest producing state without forced pooling.99
b. Pooling Requirements
To form spacing units when mineral ownership is fragmented (a
problem unique to the U.S.),100 most states have regulatory provisions to
avoid holdout by mineral owners and force those owners into a spacing
unit with nearby owners.101 This prevents recalcitrant mineral owners from
trying to hold up an operator for better lease terms (and by extension, de-
laying the benefit of ownership to other mineral owners already in the
unit).102 States adopted rules that allowed owners wanting development
performance in conventional and unconventional reservoirs, in SPE WESTERN REGIONAL
MEETING (2009). Whether the increased production is worth the cost of additional wells
is a pertinent question, likely to be answered by experimentation.
96 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.37 (2016).
97 Mineral & Surface Rights Relationships, N.D. ST. UNIV., https://www.ag.ndsu.edu/nd
oilandgaslaw/surface-mineralrights/mineralandsurfacerelationship [https://perma.cc
/K8X5-BDZT] (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
98 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.37(3). See also Brady Paul Behrens, Rule 37 Exceptions and
Small Mineral Tracts in Urban Areas: An Argument for Incorporating Compulsory
Pooling into Special Field Rules in Texas, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1053, 1064 (2012).
99 Texas Takes a Different View Towards Compulsory Unitization Legislation, TJOGEL
(Mar. 24, 2017), http://tjogel.org/texas-takes-a-different-view-towards-compulsory-unitiza
tion-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/6837-RQEE].
100 Compulsory Pooling Laws: Protecting the Conflicting Rights of Neighboring Land-
owners, supra note 58.
101 Id.
102 Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Land Assembly and the Holdout Problem
Under Sequential Bargaining, 14 AM. L. ECON. REV. 372, 373 (2012).
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to force their neighbors into producing units, for which those forced
owners would be paid their duly owed share of production.103 Pools rely
on the regulatory notion of a spacing unit, and the pooling regulations
came along after spacing units had been brought in.104 Oklahoma and
New Mexico were early adopters of statewide compulsory pooling rules
in 1935, along with their adoption of well spacing rules.105 Several other
states followed after World War II.106 Compulsory pooling was not needed
until the well spacing rules arose because mineral owners could drill
offsetting wells.
Forced pooling of wary and unwilling mineral owners has been an
issue for unconventional resources, particularly because spacing units
have become larger to accommodate horizontal drilling.107 The chances
of finding a single owner dwindle as required acreage increases. With
long laterals for horizontal wells in unconventional reservoirs, the likeli-
hood of finding a conforming surface tract is similarly small. Neither
surface use nor conventional oil and gas production is conducive to such
boundaries. This means that compulsory pooling or a similar mechanism
is relatively more important in a world of unconventional extraction.108
c. Unitization
Operational consolidation through a unit operating agreement,
compulsory if a voluntary agreement is not forthcoming, has been consid-
ered a solution to suboptimal production incentives arising from common
103 Boyce, supra note 42, at tbl.2.
104 SHARON O. FLANERY & RYAN J. MORGAN, OVERVIEW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION
AFFECTING APPALACHIAN SHALE DEVELOPMENT 13–15, https://www.steptoe-johnson.com
/sites/default/files/null/A_National_Survey_of_Statutory_Pooling_and_Unitization.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4RCC-KRY6].
105 Boyce, supra note 42, at tbl.2.
106 Libecap & Smith, supra note 42, at S606–07 (contrasting the economic benefits of
voluntary and compulsory unitization).
107 As an example, consider North Dakota spacing units that were expanded to 1280 acres,
but now have been combined into overlapping spacing units of 2560. This allows drilling
of offset laterals along the boundary of the 1280 acre units. For variation across states,
see Sylvester & Malmsheimer, supra note 90, at 60, 68, 71 tbls.2, 4–5.
108 Weaver points out that while Texas has long avoided compulsory unitization, it does
have a compulsory pooling rule. JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS
FIELDS IN TEXAS 124 (1985). Bradley reports that Kansas is the only major producing
state without compulsory pooling (Maryland does not either), even though voluntary pooling
is allowed. BRADLEY, supra note 33, at 206–07 tbl.4.9. Kansas does have a compulsory
unitization rule. Id. In contrast, Texas is joined by Pennsylvania as forcing pooling but
not unitization (North Carolina and Maryland are also in this category). Id.
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resource pools and the rule of capture.109 The unit operating agreement
spells out the rights and responsibilities of different working interests,
with the end result that a single entity is designated as the operator of the
field or deposit, with all partners sharing accordingly in the net benefits
of that extraction.110 Limits in the ability of unitization to address all
pertinent externalities in extraction have been detailed,111 but unitization
is generally regarded by economists as preferable to continued extraction
from an uncontrolled common pool.112 The dissipation of rents under
competitive extraction conditions was a major motivation for imposing
compulsory unitization statutes.113
The gains from unitization are especially pronounced in conven-
tional reservoirs because of the importance of pressure maintenance.114 In
the unconventional context pressure maintenance is less important because
wells are not tapping into a commingled reservoir. However, economies
of scale, which can be an important economic justification for conven-
tional fields as well,115 take on a special prominence. The combination of
drilling and completion technologies can be very specific to particular
geological formations. Firms that recognize more productive combinations
of inputs are likely to reduce costs per unit recovered. This mechanism
opens the door to gains from unitization, though the time profile likely
differs from the conventional case. The costs of delay are likely smaller
for unconventional resources.
d. Waste Statutes
The economic choice for oil and gas is when to extract;116 the
assumption that resources could be left in the ground and extracted in
the future underlies the concepts of efficient resource use.117 Resources
can be wasted, either in place or once they have been severed from the
ground and produced. Damaging reservoirs, e.g., squandering valuable
109 Dean Lueck & Philip Schenewerk, An Economic Analysis of Unitized and Non-Unitized
Production, in SPE ANN. TECHNICAL CONF. AND EXHIBITION 67, 67–68 (1996).
110 Id. at 73.
111 Libecap & Smith, supra note 57, at 24–25.
112 C.Y. Cynthia Lin, Strategic Decision-Making with Information and Extraction Externali-
ties: A Structural Model of the Multi-Stage Investment Timing Game in Offshore Petroleum
Production 8–9 (working paper) (2012).
113 Libecap & Wiggins, supra note 35, at 88.
114 WEAVER, supra note 108, at 20–29.
115 Id. at 33.
116 Lin, supra note 112, at 1–5.
117 Id.
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virgin pressure, is one way resources can be wasted.118 Another possibil-
ity is that resources can be lost after they are produced.119
An important distinction to draw is the difference between physical
and economic waste. Courts have focused on limiting physical waste of
resources even while ignoring economic waste.120 Physical waste is loss
of products, often after they have been produced.121 Economic waste in-
cludes the opportunity cost of producing resources by means that do not
minimize costs.122 Two specific forms of waste are included: one is failing
to extract recoverable resources because of suboptimal decisions; the
second is overinvestment in wells and other infrastructure.123
The history of oil and gas extraction in the United States includes
episodes of massive physical waste of severed production by modern stan-
dards.124 Several wells in Caddo Parish, Louisiana, burned out of control
for several years starting in 1905.125 The Lakeview gusher in California
spewed oil out of control for seventeen months from 1910–11.126 At least
four million barrels of oil are estimated to have been lost from a single
well, even as a similar amount was salvaged.127 By comparison, the Deep-
water Horizon oil spill in 2010 discharged something on the order of five
million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, most of which was lost.128
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 WEAVER, supra note 108, at 269.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Foreign efforts produced some of the most egregious waste of resources: gushers at
Baku, in Iraq and Iran, in Venezuela, and (continuing) gas flaring in Nigeria. See, e.g.,
Nigeria’s Flaring Reduction Target: 2020, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org
/en/news/feature/2017/03/10/nigerias-flaring-reduction-target-2020 [https://perma.cc/Q6
NH-UJXU] (last visited Oct. 29, 2018) (discussing the waste from continuing flaring in
Nigeria). One lesson that might be learned from this is the incentive that private mineral
ownership provides to reduce waste.
125 See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, BULLETIN REPORT 619, THE CADDO OIL AND GAS FIELD:
LOUISIANA AND TEXAS 10 (1916).
126 Kenneth I. Takahashi & Donald L. Gautier, A Brief History of Oil and Gas Exploration
in the Southern San Joaquin Valley of California, in PETROLEUM SYS. AND GEOLOGIC
ASSESSMENT OF OIL AND GAS IN THE SAN JOAQUIN BASIN PROVINCE, CALIF. 11–12 (2007).
127 Takahashi & Gautier, supra note 126, at 10–13. The Lakeview well produced between
8.4–9.4 million barrels, with estimates that half of the oil was lost to evaporation or spillage.
Id. at 12. The peak flow rate was 125,000 barrels each day—roughly twice the peak flow
from the Macondo well blowout of Deepwater Horizon fame. Id. at 11; Sherry L. Larkin,
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, in ENVTL. AND NATURAL RES. ECON.: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
(2014). The Macondo well is estimated to have leaked 4.9 million barrels into the Gulf of
Mexico over a period of three months. Id. at 106.
128 Larkin, supra note 127, at 106.
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Even when a disaster was not occurring, historically free disposal
of products was much more widespread. Data from the Energy Information
Administration indicate that flaring and venting of associated gas was
five times more widespread in the 1930s and 1940s than it is today.129
The physical waste associated with massive blowouts, fires, and
other disasters created the impetus for regulations intended to avoid
waste. Techniques for well construction were not well-developed when
these disasters occurred early in the history of extraction.130 Drilling
techniques had to be improved to avoid such waste. Avoiding the mis-
takes of past wells did not necessarily prevent the waste from gushers,
blowouts, and fires. Techniques also had to be developed to kill out-of-
control wells and extinguish fires.
There are fewer disasters today,131 but waste statutes are still
relevant. One important factor is that most unconventional wells produce
both oil and gas; conventional, associated gas is the closest analogy, in
contrast to unassociated gas deposits and conventional oil deposits with
little or no associated gas.132 Oil now (and aside from a few isolated
episodes, historically) has a higher economic value on a thermal equiva-
lency basis.133 In addition to output price motivation, there is also a cost
advantage for oil. It requires less permanent infrastructure to move after
extraction than does gas—oil is relatively easily trucked or shipped by
rail; gas requires pipelines.134 As a result, in some unconventional resource
129 Natural Gas: U.S. Natural Gas Vented and Flared, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://
www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9040us2a.htm [https://perma.cc/Z6L3-3QDQ] (last visited
Oct. 29, 2018).
130 The American Petroleum Institute standards program is an example of a nonregula-
tory means of improving technology and sharing knowledge among industry participants.
Standards apply to a wide range of technical aspects, and have been incorporated into state
regulations in some cases. See About API, AM. PETROLEUM INST. (2017), https://www.api
.org/about [https://perma.cc/B3BK-ZF3J].
131 Natural Gas: U.S. Natural Gas Vented and Flared, supra note 129.
132 See Associated gas: Definition, 2B1 CONSULTING, https://www.2b1stconsulting.com/as
sociated-gas/ [https://perma.cc/RL9Y-A53B] (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
133 Barrel of Oil Equivalent (BOE), INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b
/barrelofoilequivalent.asp [https://perma.cc/S3XE-H7V8] (last visited Oct. 29, 2018). The
premium is sometimes described as a “liquid premium,” founded in the reality that petro-
leum can be refined into a range of products. See Oil: Crude and Petroleum Products,
Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.php?
page=oil_home#tab1 [https://perma.cc/2EW6-EPZV] (last visited Oct. 29, 2018). However,
methane has more limited uses. Uses of Methane Natural Gas, SCIENCING, https://scienc
ing.com/uses-methane-natural-gas6134860.html [https://perma.cc/9R53-8WRR] (last
visited Oct. 29, 2018).
134 Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastruc-
ture Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 950 (2015).
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areas, large quantities of natural gas are effectively unwanted byprod-
ucts of oil production. In many cases this gas is flared, or burned off, at
the wellhead.135
Two areas that have received substantial attention for increased
levels of gas flaring are the Bakken shale in North Dakota and the Eagle
Ford shale in South Texas.136 North Dakota has accounted for as much
as 40 percent of all flaring in the United States in recent years.137 This
phenomenon can be interpreted as a resurgence of physical waste of
products; a key legal question surrounding these activities is whether the
cost of capturing, processing, and marketing those products exceeds their
value. It is possible that avoiding physical waste promotes economic waste.
In some circumstances, the investments necessary to recover and market
co-produced methane reduce the net value of oil production.138
e. Prorationing Rules
Resource discoveries have historically shifted supply and led to
lower prices.139 Efforts to limit supply in support of prices have two prob-
lems. First, an overall production target or cap (lower than the competi-
tively supplied quantity) must be agreed upon.140 Then, the aggregate
135 Dana R. Caulton et al., Methane Destruction Efficiency of Natural Gas Flares
Associated with Shale Formation Wells, 48 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 9548, 9548 (2014).
Flaring and venting are very similar from the perspective of the operator who manages
to externalize all costs associated with free disposal. Id. at 9549. There can be a safety
concern: vented gas may pose a combustion risk in certain situations. Id. at 9548. From
an environmental perspective, flaring is preferable. Id. at 9553. Methane is a much more
potent greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide, so venting gas is likely to have a much
greater impact on climate change emissions than flaring does. Id. Combustion efficiency
of flares is around 98 percent. Id. at 9548.
136 Simon Tomlinson, What a waste! Picture from space reveals how new U.S. oil field is
burning off enough gas to power Chicago AND Washington—because it’s cheaper than
selling it, DAILY MAIL, May 13, 2015, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2269517
/The-picture-space-shows-U-S-oil-field-burning-gas-power-Chicago-AND-Washington
-cheaper-selling-t.html#ixzz2JP2tnUbJ [https://perma.cc/7D4C-5J2U].
137 Author’s calculations using NDIC and EIA data. For greater detail, see Timothy
Fitzgerald & Case Stiglbauer, Flaring of Associated Gas in the Bakken Shale (Tex. Tech
Univ., Working Paper).
138 Energy Sector Methane Recovery and Use, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY 3 (2009), https://www
.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/methane_brochure.pdf [https://perma
.cc/VH5G-GU6R] (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
139 UNIV. OF TEX. AUSTIN, New Oil and Gas Production Technologies, STRAUSS CTR., https://
www.strausscenter.org/energy-and-security-/new-oil-and-gas-production-technologies
.html [https://perma.cc/D8AB-XWPF] (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
140 See John Vafai, Production Control in the Petroleum Industry: A Critical Analysis,
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production target must be allocated amongst the various producers. Pro-
rationing rules work to limit aggregate output from an area and then
allocate production pro rata to existing producers.141
These regulations were intended to maintain higher prices. Rules
were adopted after discoveries of large fields led to supply shocks and
prices fell accordingly.142 Voluntary rules were an initial option—early
efforts were made by the American Petroleum Institute (“API”) to reach
voluntary agreements to limit output, but these were not successful and
were superseded by state regulations.143 Oklahoma was the earliest
adopter of prorationing rules in 1913; other producing states followed
suit by the mid-1930s.144 A notable exception was California, which was
and remains an important oil producer.145 The failure of state regulations
in some states led to federal intervention to try to limit oil output and
support prices during the 1930s.146
Rules were more easily agreed to in locations where production
was concentrated among relatively few and homogeneous firms.147 In other
places, especially the expansive East Texas field with hundreds of small
producers, the incentive to free-ride on production cuts by others under-
mined negotiations for production caps, and prorationing was only achieved
by government intervention.148 The federal oil regulation experience was
not well-received by the industry, and memory of that period led the indus-
try to remain committed to state-by-state regulation in post-war years.149
Prorationing rules still exist in many states, even though they are
not binding because the overall cap is not met.150 Even if a large enough
number of unconventional wells were drilled to increase production to
SANTA CLARA LAWYER 189, 215 (1971) (discussing production targets in the context of
OPEC member states).
141 BRADLEY, supra note 33, at 87–106.
142 James D. Hamilton, Historical Oil Shocks 7–8 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 16790, 2011).
143 WILLIAMSON & DAUM, supra note 5, at 336–38.
144 Ronald L. Cook, Proration—The Regulation of Oil And Gas Production, SOC.
PETROLEUM ENG’RS (1978), https://www.onepetro.org/conference-paper/SPE-7167-MS
[https://perma.cc/A5KC-TTHE].
145 Id.
146 WILLIAMSON & DAUM, supra note 5, at 548–51.
147 Libecap & Wiggins, supra note 35, at 91–94.
148 See WILLIAMSON & DAUM, supra note 5, at 543–49 (providing a description of how
prorationing was imposed in the East Texas field during 1930–1936).
149 BRADLEY, supra note 33, at 95–103.
150 Before the recent price decline for oil and subsequent reduction in U.S. production, the
resurgence in oil production to near all-time highs made the prospect of binding prora-
tioning rules for the first time in forty-five years a nontrivial possibility.
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the point that old rules would bind, enforcement might not be a good
idea, as discussed below.
3. Environmental Regulation
An additional class of regulations relate to broader environmental
impacts associated with the oil and gas production process. As an indus-
trial process, oil and gas extraction impacts air, water, wildlife, cultural,
and other resources. There are a number of proposals for new regulation
of unconventional oil and gas development based on concerns about
environmental impacts.151 In most cases, these proposals apply equally
to conventional and unconventional resources. The balance of the discus-
sion here focuses on the resource-based issues as opposed to the environ-
mental issues.
II. TECHNOLOGICALLY INDUCED REGULATORY OBSOLESCENCE
A. The Wellhead No Longer Exists as a Pertinent Regulatory
Concept
The individual well is a focal element of the regulatory system.
Individual wells are permitted before drilling, and production is reported
at the well level.152 A single vertical borehole with multiple laterals is an
increasingly common production technique.153 Is it a single well or sev-
eral? If the latter, how are the laterals to be identified and treated? In-
consistency on this important fundament to the regulatory regime is
evidenced by the uneven application of API numbers to horizontal wells
and laterals across states.154
151 See, e.g., Hannah J. Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in
Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV.
115 (2009). See also T.J. Centner & Genti Kostandini, Local Governments Want Authority
to Address Problems: The Case of Horizontal Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing in the
United States, 49 LAND USE POL’Y 227 (2015); Thomas W. Merrill & David. M. Schizer,
The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water Contamination: a
Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 145 (2013); Rahm, supra note 28.
152 Crude Oil and Well Counts (since 1935), R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., http://www.rrc.state
.tx.us/oil-gas/research-and-statistics/production-data/historical-production-data/crude-oil
-production-and-well-counts-since-1935/ (last updated Feb. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc
/4VZN-C29D].
153 Overview of oil and gas exploration and production process, supra note 43.
154 See, e.g., Samantha Malone et al., Data Inconsistencies from states with unconventional
oil and gas technology, J. ENVTL. SCI. & HEALTH 501, 501 (2015).
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When natural gas was regulated with a wellhead price, the wellhead
existed. However, since natural gas regulation was lifted in 1978, the regu-
latory notion of a wellhead has slipped into the abstract.155 Operators en-
gage in complex accounting gymnastics to calculate netback prices to the
wellhead. When gas and liquids are sold miles from the wellhead, the costs
of transportation and processing are allocated against sale proceeds.156 This
drives a wedge between the gross and net value of the products. That is es-
pecially pertinent to the royalty owner, who is paid on a netback basis.157
Unconventional oil and gas are co-produced in varying propor-
tions. Fluctuations in market prices and physical proportions of the
products determine their relative importance across space and time. As
such, trying to characterize wells as oil or gas wells from a regulatory
standpoint is not as clear as for conventional oil and unassociated gas wells.
Of course, some wells will produce more oil than gas, and the converse.
However, what really matters is how the stream of extracted products is
processed and sold. This connects the individual wellhead (or pad) to gas
processing for methane and natural gas liquids.158 The wellhead is more
integrated in the supply chain than ever, but the regulatory regime
treats wells autonomously.
B. The Basic Regulatory Unit Relies on Commonality Not Relevant
to Unconventional Resources
Well spacing requirements are a primary regulatory mechanism
for avoiding common pool waste.159 They can be adjusted across fields to
account for underlying geology—while one field might have 40-acre
155 Carol A. Dahl & Thomas K. Matson, Evolution of the U.S. Natural Gas Industry in
Response to Changes in Transaction Costs, 74 LAND ECON. 390, 395 (1998).
156 Byron C. Keeling, In the New Era of Oil and Gas Royalty Accounting: Drafting a Roy-
alty Clause that Actually Says What the Parties Intend It to Mean, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 516,
532 (2017).
157 Corazón Morales Siddayao, Is the netback value of gas economically efficient?, 21 ORG.
OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES ENERGY REV. 151, 153 (Sept. 1997).
158 Natural Gas Liquids Primer—With a Focus on the Appalachian Region, U.S. DEP’T.
OF ENERGY 1, 2, 23 (2017), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/12/f46/NGL%20
Primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/8S6R-GBSE]. Raw or “wet” natural gas often contains methane
and other related compounds collectively known as natural gas liquids (“NGLs”). Id. These
include valuable products: ethane, butane, isobutane, propane, pentane, and natural gas-
oline. Id. In order to separate the NGLs from the methane, the wet gas must be processed
in a fractionation (or gas) plant. Id.
159 BRADLEY, supra note 33, at 141–43 (well spacing requirements developed to prevent
excessive mining).
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spacing (one well for each forty surface acres) a neighboring field with
different geologic characteristics could have, more sensibly, 160-acre
spacing. The discretion to set spacing unit size and to allow exemptions
to the standard is generally exercised by the state oil and gas regulatory
body.160 Underlying the logic of the spacing unit is that each unit covers
the area drained most effectively by a single well.161
The extent to which one well will interfere with, or reduce the
production of, another is learned by experience. When spacing units were
introduced in the 1920s and 1930s, they were much smaller than today.162
Spacing units have no uniform standard size and have been amended to
allow new wells that do not interfere with existing ones.163
Unconventional resources use directional and horizontal drilling
to provide greater exposure of the wellbore to the source rocks.164 There
are economies of scale with using a common surface location for several
wells. The result is “pad drilling” that disturbs less surface than numerous
vertical wells.165 However, with multiple wells on the same pad, typically
all wells are located in one drilling unit.166 The notion of spacing corre-
sponding to an area drained by a single well has fallen by the wayside.
One reason for spacing units was to keep potentially competing
conventional drillers far enough apart so their wells did not interfere
with each other.167 Pad drilling avoids this complication because a single
firm will operate all wells on a given pad.168 The firm must determine the
optimal number of wells to drill on a single spacing unit. That decision
is determined by technological choices, such as measuring the azimuth of
a frac, which can be affected by varying inputs.169 Pad drilling is effectively
preemptory unitization. Technology and cost economies have solved one
of the long-term problems oil and gas regulation sought to address.
Once a spacing unit contains more than one well, the timing of
drilling additional wells is an open question. A single well in a spacing
160 See Behrens, supra note 98, at 1055 (providing an example of this concept in Texas).
161 Oil and Gas Basics, supra note 80.
162 Boyce, supra note 42, at 18.
163 Oil and Gas Basics, supra note 80.
164 Overview of oil and gas exploration and production process, supra note 43, at 7.
165 Al Pickett, Technologies, Methods Reflect Industry Quest to Reduce Drilling Footprint,
AM. OIL & GAS REP., July 2010.
166 Id.
167 Overview of oil and gas exploration and production process, supra note 43, at 7.
168 Pickett, supra note 165.
169 See Seyed Hassan Fallahzadeh et al., Near Wellbore Hydraulic Fracture Propagation
from Perforations in Tight Rocks: The Roles of Fracturing Fluid Viscosity, 10 ENERGIES
359 (2017).
162 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 43:137
unit might be used as evidence of development, even if that well cannot
extract all of the resources in place.170 The firm can keep the entire
acreage leased in this way, and this practice has been an anecdotal
explanation for wasteful drilling patterns to avoid having to lease acre-
age again, perhaps under terms more favorable to the mineral owner.171
Smith (2014) presents an option pricing model to suggest that this be-
havior is not likely to make a difference for a large number of wells.172
The mineral owner may be concerned with the drilling of rela-
tively few wells, or the holding of acreage with a single well. The value
of the mineral estate is maximized if it is fully exploited. A mineral
owner only leases acreage if the owner wants to produce the minerals
and recognize the value.173 In that case, the mineral owner would like all
of the oil and gas extracted, and will be concerned if an insufficient number
of wells is drilled to do so. The traditional recourse for the mineral owner
is a Pugh clause, by which undrilled acreage can be released.174 But if the
undrilled wells are in a spacing unit that already contains one producing
well, then the mineral owner does not have the ability to exercise a Pugh
option.175 So, the traditional contractual remedy is handicapped by the
abuse of the spacing unit.
Permitting several wells on a spacing unit also poses an interest-
ing problem for the force-pooled mineral owner. Suppose an owner is
forced into a production unit, but perhaps only one well is drilled because
of poor performance, or an unexpected price shock. The force-pooled min-
eral owner will be paid proportionally for production. However, suppose
the single well does not enter her property—she is paid from the produc-
ing unit rather than extraction from her own minerals. Recall that the
forced pooling occurred to avoid holdout for an area drained by a single
170 James L. Smith, The Option to Hold a Petroleum Lease by Production: A User’s Guide
to the Shale Gas Drilling Boom 8 (Nov. 28, 2014) (unpublished working paper) (on file
with the Department of Finance, Southern Methodist University), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2531997 [https://perma.cc/Y522-F5JX].
171 Id.
172 Id. at 3–4, 8, 15.
173 Timothy Fitzgerald, Oil and Gas Leasing, 1 MONT. STATE UNIV. (2017), http://msuex
tension.org/publications/AgandNaturalResources/MT201209AG.pdf [https://perma.cc
/VY72-TKXJ].
174 Timothy Fitzgerald, Importance of Mineral Rights and Royalty Interests for Rural
Residents and Landowners, CHOICES, 4th Quarter 2014, at 3.
175 Gregory C. Cox, Top O&G Leasing Issues: Pooling and Pugh Clauses, LAW360 (2014),
https://www.gtlaw.com/-/media/files/insights/published-articles/020906law360-top-og-leas
ing-issues-pooling-and-pugh-clauses.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9HR-KQJS].
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well.176 But the single well is a myth, and the mineral owner has been
coerced into a lease that she cannot break via Pugh clause (because there
is only one spacing unit).177 And, because the remaining minerals are
physically located in her portion of the unit, the other mineral owners will
demand the unit remain intact so that they will be paid for unit produc-
tion not directly tied to their property.
C. Other Commonality Concerns
The geophysical characteristics of unconventional resources—low
permeability and transmissivity—should attenuate commonality concerns.
If hydrocarbons are trapped in place, then migration to a neighboring
wellbore should not be a major concern. The reliance of unconventional
extraction on hydraulic fracturing178 complicates that simple reality. Reser-
voirs are fractured for the exact purpose of increasing transmissivity,
allowing those trapped hydrocarbons to flow to the wellbore.179 The fracture
is man-made, so the idea of a fracture as trespass allowing theft of mineral
resource is quite real. The very same microseismic technology that allows
engineers to carefully monitor fractures and reservoir stimulation could
allow for verification that trespass occurred.180
Any hopes that new technologies would lift the mantle of common-
ality from oil and gas extraction were dashed by the Texas Supreme Court
in Coastal v. Garza.181 The decision upheld the rule of capture as the
primary means of establishing ownership, even where trespass by frac-
ture occurred.182 The primary logic of the court in this case was that it
was not possible to determine where fractures are in the subsurface, and
176 Compulsory Pooling Laws: Protecting the Conflicting Rights of Landowners, supra note
58.
177 Pugh(eee) . . . Get those lands outta here: A look at the Pugh Clause, OIL & GAS. R.,
https://www.theoilandgasreport.com/tag/pugh-clause/ [https://perma.cc/522U-JA3M] (last
visited Oct. 29, 2018).
178 UNIV. OF TEX. AUSTIN, Hydraulic Fracturing, STRAUSS CTR., https://www.strausscenter
.org/energy-and-security/hydraulic-fracturing.html [https://perma.cc/SET9-TYJC] (last
visited Oct. 29, 2018).
179 Hydraulic Fracturing, supra note 178.
180 Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: If Fractures Cross Property Lines, Is There an
Actionable Subsurface Trespass?, 54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 361, 362–70 (2014).
181 Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 13, 16–17 (Tex. 2008).
For a more complete treatment of this case, see Christopher J. Kulander, Common Law
Aspects of Shale Oil and Gas Development, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 367, 384–88 (2013).
182 Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 2, 42.
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therefore where oil and gas originate and end up.183 Most other states
have followed this decision to stick with the rule of capture rather than
recognize new technical ability and different underlying resource charac-
teristics.184 This forces the mineral owner into an administrative setting
to obtain relief, because the capture itself is legal.185
Boyce (2013) identifies three traditional solutions to the common
pool problem: consolidation by buying out neighbors and internalizing any
pertinent externalities; voluntary prorationing of output through nego-
tiation; and voluntary unitization, a contractual joint venture.186 Each
represents a nonregulatory approach.187 Unitization (and its cousin, com-
munitization) has been seen as a viable alternative to losses attributable
to common pool reservoirs.188 The means by which unitization is achieved
is a key concern, as the transaction costs might outweigh the benefits of
unitization.189 Firms may not be able to reach voluntary agreements be-
cause of imperfect information about the nature of deposits,190 or because
of competing property claims to the common pool resource.191 Preemptory
unitization has long been advocated as a means to minimize duplication
of infrastructure and waste.192
D. What Is Waste?
Unconventional resources are generally mixtures of oil, gas, and
other valuable liquids (natural gas liquids, including propane and eth-
ane).193 This contrasts with the traditional binary classification of oil and
183 Kulander, supra note 181, at 388–89. Technical changes in microseismicity mean that
this is not strictly true. Id.
184 Colleen E. Lamarre, Owning the Center of the Earth: Hydraulic Fracturing and Sub-
surface Trespass in the Marcellus Shale Region, 21 CORNELL J.L. PUB. POL’Y 457, 462 (2011).
185 Oil and Gas Basics, supra note 80.
186 Boyce, supra note 42, at 10–11.
187 Id. While both instruments might seem to address the incentive to overproduce, Boyce
demonstrates the theoretical superiority of prorationing to unitization when products are
sold in a monoposonistic setting. Id.
188 Libecap & Smith, supra note 42, at S606–07.
189 Gary L. Libecap & Steven N. Wiggins, The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on
Regulation: The Case of Oil Field Unitization, 93 J. POL. ECON. 690, 691, 693, 695 (1985).
190 Steven N. Wiggins & Gary D. Libecap, Oil Field Unitization: Contractual Failure in
the Presence of Imperfect Information, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 368, 368–69 (1985).
191 Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Self-Enforcing Provisions of Oil and Gas Unit
Operating Agreements: Theory and Evidence, 15 J. L., ECON., & ORG. 526, 544 (1999).
192 DAINTITH, supra note 60, at 429–31.
193 See Natural Gas Liquids Primer—With a Focus on the Appalachian Region, supra note
158, at 2, 19, and accompanying text (explaining NGLs).
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gas wells. Even if an unconventional well produces a majority of thermal
equivalent units as gas, the “wet” nature of unconventional raw gas
streams can imply that the share of the total value from dry gas is much
lower.194
Waste of oil and gas resources is generally prohibited.195 But un-
conventional resources present new problems. The days of uncontrollable
blowouts are largely gone; technical means for preventing and addressing
such accidents have vastly improved, and the number of virgin conventional
reservoirs capable of producing a “gusher” has dwindled.196 Instead of
overt waste like a blowout, the jointness of production leads to concerns
about waste of one product.
North Dakota has been an exemplar of a rural resource boom dis-
tant from existing infrastructure.197 As a consequence, flaring of natural
gas expanded dramatically—to the point that, in recent years, in excess
of 30 percent of all gas has been flared at the wellhead.198 Increased flar-
ing has also been observed in Texas (albeit at lower levels than in North
Dakota), especially in the Eagle Ford shale.199 These are more than just
unfortunate coincidences. By treating unconventional resource develop-
ment as a collection of autonomous wells, rather than an integrated
production process including gathering and transmission pipelines, along
with appurtenant fractionation plants, some product will be wasted. This
leaves regulators in the (ill-suited) position to determine if the waste is
merely physical or economic. North Dakota has moved in the direction
194 Id.
195 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-03 (2016). The definition of waste (N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 38-08-02.19 (2016)) is: “a) Physical waste, as that term is generally understood in the oil
and gas industry b) The inefficient, excessive, or improper use of, or the unnecessary dis-
sipation of reservoir energy c) The locating, spacing, drilling, equipping, operating, or
producing of any oil or gas well or wells in a manner which causes, or tends to cause, reduc-
tion in the quantity of oil or gas ultimately recoverable from a pool under prudent and
proper operations, or which causes or tends to cause unnecessary or excessive surface loss
or destruction of oil and gas d) The inefficient storing of oil e) The production of oil or gas in
excess of transportation or marketing facilities or in excess of reasonable market demand.”
196 Gillian Schout et al., Impact of an historic underground gas well blowout on the current
methane chemistry in a shallow groundwater system, PNAS, Nov. 27, 2017, at 296.
197 See John McChesney, Oil Boom Puts Strain in North Dakota Towns, NPR (Dec. 2,
2011), https://www.npr.org/2011/12/02/142695152/oil-boom-puts-strain-on-north-dakota
-towns [https://perma.cc/78E2-TRXP].
198 ENERGY AND ENVTL. RES. CTR., Flaring, UNIV. OF N.D. (2013), https://www.undeerc.org
/bakken/pdfs/NDIC-NDPC-Flaring-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/QA64-DW3L].
199 See Bret Wells, Please Give US One More Oil Boom—I Promise Not to Screw It Up
This Time: The Broken Promise of Casinghead Gas Flaring in the Eagle Ford Shale, 9
TEX. J. OIL, GAS, & ENERGY L. 319, 320–21 (2014).
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of a more holistic treatment of new wells, conditioning well approvals on
broad plans to capture and market associated gas.200
In light of the greater integration of the supply chain, it is impor-
tant to recognize that oil and gas commissions do not directly regulate
pipelines and infrastructure. State public utility commissions usually
have primary responsibility, though interstate transmission lines are
regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.201 Oil and
natural gas pipelines are subject to different oversight. Balkanization of
regulatory authority makes consideration of economic waste difficult be-
cause value depends on vertical linkages. Identified waste at an interme-
diate point in the supply chain may not be waste at all, but can be an
artifact of downstream constraints or regulation.
E. Water and Oil Mix More Than They Used to
One result of the transition to unconventional resources and
extraction techniques is that water is an essential input in the produc-
tion process.202 Oilfield brines have long been produced as a byproduct of
conventional technologies—they continue to be generated as “produced
water” that has been identified as a key pathway for potential environ-
mental damage.203 Hydraulic fracturing operations require base water as
well (which can be recycled from produced water in some cases).204
Recognition of the technical jointness of oil and gas and water means that
calls for regulatory reform with tighter linkages between the two sectors
have abounded.205 The two resources have separate regulatory regimes.
In fact, water often has two: one for source water and one for disposal.206
200 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., Sundry Notice Flaring Requests
6, BLM (2017), https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-office/projects/nepa/62240/108472/13
2791/NDFO_Flaring_EA.pdf [https://perma.cc/UKS8-H72Z].
201 Pipelines for New Energy, ENERGY & INFRASTRUCTURE (2016), http://www.energyandin
fra structure.com/sections/columns1/467-pipelines-for-new-energy [https://perma.cc/GQ85
-MVRB].
202 Hydraulic Fracturing, supra note 178.
203 Sheila M. Olmstead et al., Shale gas development impacts on surface water quality in
Pennsylvania, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4962, 4962 (2013).
204 An overview of hydraulic fracturing and other formation stimulation technologies for
shale gas production, JOINT RES. CTR. OF THE EURO. COMM’N at 7 (2013), http://publica
tions.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC86065/an%20over view%20of%20hydraulic
%20fracturing%20and%20other%20stimulation%20technologies%20(2).pdf [https://
perma.cc/2FC5-Z2N2].
205 Jeffrey C. King et al., Factual Causation: The Missing Link in Hydraulic Fracture-
Groundwater Contamination Litigation, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 341, 358–60 (2012).
206 For example, source water and disposal pertaining to the Marcellus Shale are governed
by different regulatory regimes. Kevin J. Garber & Jean M. Mosites, Water Sourcing and
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In some states, source water falls into different regulatory regimes de-
pending on whether it comes from surface or ground water.207 The gains
from integrating these regimes are a topic unto themselves.
III. CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES
Technical changes make existing regulations obsolete, but do not
eliminate all problems. Unconventional resources present some novel
issues. Interested parties have worked to contract around the new reali-
ties. Two contractual interactions are discussed: the principal-agent
problem between mineral owner and developer addressed by the oil and
gas lease; and the interactions between different oil and gas companies,
which are less circumscribed.
A. Oil and Gas Leases
The mineral owner and developer engage in a contract—usually
an oil and gas lease—to outline rights and responsibilities of each.208 Not
every mineral owner signs a lease to take a royalty interest. Some decide
to participate in development, which means they bear costs as well as re-
ceive benefits. Participation is relatively rare, so most mineral owners
are bound by a lease. Some interactions are zero-sum, affecting only the
distribution of gains, whereas others affect the total amount of surplus
created.209 From a social perspective, the latter are far more important.
Zero-sum interactions may be salient to the owner, such as requiring
third-party validation of product pricing rather than accepting netback
pricing at the wellhead.
The positive-sum interactions pertain to the efficient exploitation
of the resource. Because commonality is not the primary concern for
unconventional resources,210 the primary considerations are the dynam-
ics of the leasing and development process, and the complementarity of
wells and related infrastructure.
Wastewater Disposal for Marcellus Shale Development in Pennsylvania, 32 ENERGY &
MIN. L. INST. 339, 341 (2011).
207 Id.
208 Anderson, supra note 59, at 382–94.
209 See Benjamin Holliday, New Oil and Old Laws: Problems in Allocation of Production
to Owners of Non-Participating Royalty Interests in the Era of Horizontal Drilling, 44 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 771, 779–80, 788–89 (2013).
210 See discussion supra Section II.B.
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1. Sticky Leases
The stickiness of oil and gas leases is one potential impediment
to social efficiency. The stickiness stems from long-term commitments to
the developer, which provide valuable security and reduce the chances
for holdup. Defining the secondary term of a lease by production leaves
substantial discretion for the lessee. The lessor has a limited number of
ways to opt out early.211 One of the few ways is the Pugh clause.212 This
clause allows the mineral owner to separate drilled and undrilled acre-
age.213 The undrilled acreage can then be leased again, perhaps to a dif-
ferent firm, or under more favorable terms.214 The Pugh clause allows
separation of undrilled acreage outside the spacing unit—if the undrilled
acreage is inside the spacing unit, the mineral owner is out of luck.215
2. Infrastructure
Unconventional resource development relies heavily on a network
of infrastructure over a larger spatial extent than that of the individual
mineral owner or lessor. To develop an unconventional play efficiently,
wells, pipelines, frac plants, water source and disposal facilities, com-
pressor plants, transmission lines, rail loading terminals, and electric
power lines are all needed, often extending over a large area.216 These
complementary investments are at risk of hold-up if negotiated sequen-
tially.217 Contracts with a large number of parties—mineral and surface
owners over a large area—are likely to benefit from efforts to reduce trans-
action costs. Landowner coalitions and joint ventures by firms reduce the
number of parties and may be conducive to simpler contracts for comple-
mentary infrastructure.
B. Inter-firm Contracts
Oil and gas development offers an array of contracts that have
evolved to solve problems between firms. Joint operating agreements,
211 Pugh(eee) . . . Get those lands outta here, supra note 177.
212 Id.
213 See discussion supra Section II.B.
214 Pugh(eee) . . . Get those lands outta here, supra note 177.
215 Id.
216 See Unconventional Resources Development—Managing the Risks, EXXON MOBIL (Sept.
2014), https://cdn.exxonmobil.com/~/media/global/files/energy-and-environment/unconven
tional_resources_development_risk_management_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ9F -NN59].
217 Current efforts to expand gathering and transmission lines in North Dakota are a
prime example—this inability to install infrastructure has contributed to the flaring
problem and waste. See Fitzgerald & Stiglbauer, supra note 137.
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farmouts, dry hole or bottom hole contributions, production sharing
agreements, allocation agreements, and other contracts are regularly
used to share either inputs or outputs.218 Conversion to unconventional
resources does not necessarily preclude these same contractual remedies
from being employed. Adaptation of traditional contracts to the new
technical realities is not yet fully clear.
The inevitable comparative advantages of various firms in the
constituent parts of the exploration and production process could lend
themselves to valuable joint ventures. Chesapeake Energy developed an
enviable reputation in leasing and contracts, while other firms excelled
in drilling, avoiding steep production decline rates, and other distinct
aspects of the production process.219 Allowing discretion to companies to
engage in various arrangements and combine specializations could yield
low-cost solutions to some of the problems identified here. The same could
happen via acquisitions.
IV. CONSIDERATIONS FOR REFORM
One possible reform is to require unitization. Preemptory unitiza-
tion has its own shortcomings, but the federal exploratory case may offer
some guidance. As early as the 1920s, Henry Doherty wanted to extend
the principles of federal exploratory unitization to all development.220
The shortcomings of voluntary agreements are recognized.
Even if full-blown unitization is not feasible, recognizing the
complementary nature of investments and increasing the spatial scale
of the regulatory scheme from the individual wellhead to the project level
would make a number of aspects easier to handle. Expanded regulatory
units including several or dozens of well pads and attendant infrastruc-
ture would more closely reflect the viable economic unit than a spacing
unit allowing a single well to drain a specific area. The regulatory units
should be larger than the current expanded spacing units, large enough
to include the necessary infrastructure investments. This would, in turn,
218 Joint operating agreements are the basis of unitization agreements, which are dis-
cussed above. A farmout is a partnership in which a new partner is brought in to fulfill
some conditions (often drilling a new well) in exchange for part of the working interest.
Dry or bottom hole contributions specify payments to be made when a well is dry or
reaches total depth. Production share contracts, or other allocations of output, are also used
in various settings. For detailed information about oilfield terminology, see HOWARD R.
WILLIAMS ET AL., WILLIAMS & MEYERS MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS (2006).
219 ZUCKERMAN, supra note 1, at 191.
220 DAINTITH, supra note 60, at 268–70.
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provide incentives for firms to enter into contractual arrangements like
joint operating agreements. Environmental concerns that come with de-
velopment might also be more easily addressed at this scale.
Other alternatives exist. If a shared property paradigm is adopted,
the result is apt to look more like compulsory unitization.221 There may
be room for broader market-based approaches like bonding and insur-
ance, though these are targeted at environmental rather than resource
concerns.222
The economic stress of low prices has put emphasis on places where
the unconventional model works.223 It has also increased incentives to cut
cost and boost productivity. Weathering the price shocks, first for gas and
now for oil, has solidified unconventional resources in the future mix.
The results have been impressive, both in terms of technological gains,
and in terms of the greater resiliency of production to lower prices.
Now may be a good time for regulatory agencies to take a breather
and consider larger changes. Instead of piling on additional layers of
regulation (e.g., federal fracking rules), regulations appropriate for new
technology would provide greater benefits. Given the recent change in
prospects for additional federal regulation with the Trump administra-
tion,224 states may well have an opportunity to be laboratories for experi-
mentation on the oil and gas front.
This review also identifies some opportunities for research in
answering questions around the edges and testing refutable hypotheses.
As an example, recent work on the efficiency implications of unit operating
agreements finds long-run productivity higher in unitized fields, though
short-run mechanisms for those long-term gains have limited statistical
support.225 Before expanded compulsory unitization is proposed, identify-
ing how short-term dynamics (which may be more important in the fast
decline of unconventional resources) operate is useful.
221 Peter M. Gerhart & Robert E. Cheren, Recognizing the Shared Ownership of Sub-
surface Resource Pools, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1041, 1078–81 (2013).
222 David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to Regulating the Energy
Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic
Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1523, 1546–47 (2014).
223 See, e.g., The Marcellus Shale, Explained, supra note 27.
224 See, e.g., Eric Lipton & Hiroko Tabuchi, Driven by Trump Policy Changes, Fracking
Booms on Public Lands, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10
/27/climate/trump-fracking-drilling-oil-gas.html [https://perma.cc/3TYR-SFQT].
225 Andrew T. Balthrop & Kurt E. Schnier, A Regression Discontinuity Approach to Measur-
ing the Effectiveness of Oil and Natural Gas Regulation to Address the Common-Pool
Externality, 44 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 118, 119 (2016).
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CONCLUSION
The oil and gas sector will continue to be a significant part of the
energy mix. Continued technological progress is probable, but a repeat
of the recent technological leap that allowed unconventional resources to
become economic seems less likely. As such, now it is time to take stock
of the reality of the traditional regulatory regime for oil and gas extrac-
tion. The current regulatory framework for oil and gas extraction is a
legacy of more than a century of experience. As technological change has
revolutionized oil and gas production, the regulatory framework has
become obsolete in important areas. Private parties have an opportunity
to contract around some of these failings. Those areas that do not allow
for contractual remedies are excellent candidates for regulatory reform.
The United States has managed deregulation, or perhaps more
accurately re-regulation, of parts of the energy sector toward a more effi-
cient market. Interstate natural gas pipelines are a crucial example.226
The extraction sector is ripe for regulatory reforms that could solidify the
market-based exchange going forward as unconventional resources loom
ever more important in the resource base.
226 Jeff D. Makholm, Decoupling for Energy Distributors: Changing 19th Century Tariff
Structures to Address 21st Century Energy Markets, 29 ENERGY. L.J. 157, 166 (2008).

